Preserving Your Pocket Book: Narrowing the Unilateral Power of a Co-owner by Bell, Kristen E.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 69 | Number 1
Fall 2008
Preserving Your Pocket Book: Narrowing the
Unilateral Power of a Co-owner
Kristen E. Bell
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Kristen E. Bell, Preserving Your Pocket Book: Narrowing the Unilateral Power of a Co-owner, 69 La. L. Rev. (2008)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol69/iss1/8
Preserving Your Pocket Book: Narrowing the
Unilateral Power of a Co-owner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .......................................................................... 140
II. The Current Louisiana Rules ............................................... 141
III. B ackground .......................................................................... 144
A . H istorical Setting ........................................................... 144
B. Development of Louisiana Co-ownership
Provisions ....................................................................... 148
C. Comparison of Louisiana's Rules with Foreign
Source Provisions ........................................................... 150
1. Exigency Requirement ............................................. 151
2. Reluctant Tone ......................................................... 151
IV. Flaws of Article 800 ............................................................. 152
A. The Difficult Application of "Necessary" ................ 153
B. Co-owner Manipulation ................................................. 155
C. Investment Obstacles Caused by Legal
A m biguities .................................................................... 157
V. Solution: Two-Pronged Test ................................................ 157
A. Imminent Circumstances and Good Faith ...................... 158
1. Imminent Circumstances of Emergency or
Threat of Loss .......................................................... 158
2. G ood Faith ............................................................... 161
a. Definition in the Co-ownership Context ............ 162
b. As Opposed to the Prudent Man Standard ......... 163
c. Comparison with Similar Duties ........................ 166
B. Majority Consent Absent Imminent Circumstances ..... 170
V I. C onclusion ........................................................................... 173
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Air-conditioning installation.1 Property taxes. 2 Lawn care.
3
Insurance payments.4 Sewage treatment facilities expansion.5 Roof
replacement. All of these expenses have been classified by courts
as "necessary" to preserve property. The broad range of these
expenditures presents a difficulty: while some are undeniably
required to prevent loss or imminent damage, others are merely
useful or convenient.
Under the default co-ownership regime in Louisiana, a co-
owner may take "necessary steps for the preservation" of the co-
owned thing without the consent of any other co-owner.7 In
addition, the acting co-owner is entitled to reimbursement for these
"necessary expenses ... from the other co-owners in proportion to
their shares." This scheme gives a Louisiana co-owner more
unilateral power to incur necessary expenses than in almost any
other jurisdiction.
Under the Louisiana rule, the initial determination of whether
an expense is necessary to preserve the property is left entirely to
the subjective intention of a single co-owner. Since beliefs about
what is or is not necessary will inevitably vary among co-owners,
granting such vast unilateral authority is likely to result in conflict
among the parties, particularly when reimbursement is demanded.
The other co-owners are consequently left with the choice of either
writing a reimbursement check or wasting time and money in a
courtroom disputing the necessity of the act. The ambiguity of the
Louisiana rules causes tension among co-owners, often springing
unforeseen expenses and creating excessive litigation.
Due to an increased incidence of co-ownership arrangements
across the nation,9 a new standard must emerge in Louisiana to
Copyright 2008, by KRISTEN E. BELL.
1. Knighten v. Knighten, 809 So. 2d 324, 329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001),
writ denied, 805 So. 2d 207 (La. 2002).
2. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 860 So. 2d 104, 118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003),
writ denied, 862 So. 2d 995 (La. 2004).
3. Succession of Steckler, 712 So. 2d 1066, 1071 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
not considered, 726 So. 2d 17 (La.), reconsideration denied, 728 So. 2d 880 (La.
1998).
4. Harmon v. Harmon, 617 So .2d 1373, 1377 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
5. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Invs. v. Crown Am. Corp.,
639 F. Supp. 838, 845 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
6. Id.
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 800 (2006).
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 806.
9. See N. William Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and
Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REv. 582, 587 (1966); Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with
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remedy these ills. The Louisiana co-ownership rules should be
changed such that a co-owner's unilateral authority is determined
according to the exigency of the circumstances, as it is in many
other jurisdictions. For instance, if the property faces an imminent
threat, a co-owner should be permitted to act alone, as a lapse of
time needed to consult with the other co-owners would only further
endanger the property. In such circumstances, the acting co-owner
should be charged with a duty of good faith to ensure that he acts
within reasonable bounds. Absent such an emergency, a co-owner
wishing to perform an ordinary act of preservation should be
expected to do more. Unilateral action is unnecessary in such
situations and should generally be prohibited. The law should
require that a co-owner consult the others holding an interest in the
co-owned property prior to incurring the necessary, yet not
imminent, expense. Such a rule would better serve co-owners
because, unlike current articles 800 and 806, it gives precise notice
of when necessary expenses may be incurred.
This Comment will begin in Part I by explaining the current
Louisiana rules granting a co-owner authority to incur, and to be
reimbursed for, necessary expenses. The interpretation of these
rules by Louisiana courts and scholars will be detailed in Part II.
Part III will contain a brief analysis of the historical development
of civilian co-ownership provisions, the impact that the past has
had on the Louisiana rules, and the current state of co-ownership
law in European jurisdictions. Part IV will describe the flaws of the
current rule in light of practical examples which display its faulty
application and its discouraging effect on real estate investment.
Last, Part V will propose a new standard, with an analysis
showcasing its more sensible approach and investor friendly
effects.
II. THE CURRENT LOUISIANA RULES
The pertinent legislation to this discussion is Louisiana Civil
Code articles 800 and 806. Read in pari materia, these articles lay
the foundation for preservation of co-owned property and
reimbursement for expenses flowing from such acts. Specifically,
article 800 authorizes unilateral preservation of co-owned property,
Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant Possession Value Liability and A Call
for Default Rule Reform, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 331, 398-402 (1994); Marshall E.
Tracht, Co-ownership and Condominium, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
EcoNoMIcs 62,64 (1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/1400book.pdf.
10. Those acts that would prevent gradual damage to the property.
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providing that "[a] co-owner may without the concurrence of any
other co-owner take necessary steps for the preservation of the
thing that is held in indivision.
' 11
A co-owner acting under article 800 may receive
reimbursement for preservatory expenses by way of article 806,
which provides in pertinent part that: "A co-owner who on account
of the thing held in indivision has incurred necessary expenses...
is entitled to reimbursement from the other co-owners in
proportion to their shares.'
12
The key terms "necessary" and "preservation" are not defined
by this section of the Code; however, their true meaning is vital to
the proper application of these rules. The definitions of these terms
may be aided by the use of other code articles, doctrinal sources,
and jurisprudential interpretation.
What is "necessary"? This amorphous term, appearing in both
articles 800 and 806, may have a different connotation depending
on the context in which it is used. In a co-ownership setting, the
meaning of "necessary" is assisted by drawing a distinction
between categories of expenses-those that are necessary, useful,
or luxurious. Necessary expenses are those that are "incurred for
the preservation of the thing" or to relieve the property of private
or public burdens. 14 Examples of such expenses would be property
taxes 15 or insurance payments.' 6 The jurisprudence also includes
repairs other than those needed for ordinary maintenance within
the definition of necessary expenses.17 "Useful" expenses, on the
other hand, are defined as those that enhance the value of the
property rather than preserve its condition.' 8 Finally, "luxurious"
expenses are contrasted from the other classes of expenses in that
they are "made for the gratification of one's personal
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 800 (emphasis added).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 806 (emphasis added).
13. A.N. YIANNOPOLOUS, PROPERTY § 275, in 2 LOuIsIANA CIvIL LAW
TREATISE 551-53 (4th ed. 2001).
14. Id. (stating that costs of ordinary maintenance and repairs are not
necessary expenses). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 527.
15. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 860 So. 2d 104, 118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003),
writ denied, 862 So. 2d 995 (La. 2004).
16. Harmon v. Harmon, 617 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
17. See YIANNOPOLOUS, supra note 13, at 551 n.8 (citing Dunlap v.
Whitmer, 69 So. 189 (La. 1914); Gregory v. Kedley, 185 So. 105 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1938)).
18. YIANNOPOLOUS, supra note 13, at 551. Because expenses for ordinary
maintenance and repair do not fall within the category of "necessary" expenses,
it is likely that they fit within this category of "useful" expenses.
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predilections."' 9 Therefore, compared to useful and luxurious
expenses, "necessary" expenses may be defined as those that are
unavoidable or required under the circumstances to protect the
property.
What is "preservation"? Doctrine equates the term preservation
with conservation. 20 Acts of this type prevent the Froperty from
being "destroyed, damaged or lost for the owner." While it is
clear from doctrine that acts of preservation consist of something
less than what is involved with other categories of acts, the
boundaries distinguishing one kind of act from another are very
blurred.22 Classification of an act as one to preserve property
should largely depend on the purpose of the act, rather than its
nature.23
In attempting to interpret the terms "necessary" and
"preservation," the potential for subjective alteration of their
meanings becomes apparent. Scholarly guidance is unmistakably
valuable to the proper interpretation of articles 800 and 806 and
has no doubt aided co-owners and courts in resolving difficult
exegetical issues. However, practical application of this rule
reveals that one co-owner's idea of an expense necessary to protect
property may be very different from that of another co-owner.
24
Furthermore, co-owners have also struggled with classifying an act
25
as one to preserve. With a few linguistic alterations to the
19. Id. Louisiana Civil Code article 1259 also describes luxurious expenses
as those for "mere pleasure ... which are only made for the accommodation or
convenience of the owner or possessor of the estate, and which do not increase
its value." LA. CIV. CODE art. 1259.
20. A.N. YIANNOPOLOUS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 87, in 3 LOuISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 182-84 (4th ed. 2000).
21. Id. Acts of preservation are further defined by contrasting them from
acts of administration and disposition. Dispositive acts tend to deprive or divest
an owner of his interest in a real right. Id. In contrast to acts of preservation and
disposition, both with somewhat concrete definitions, administrative acts make
up a residual category consisting of acts of management that "exceed the limits
of mere conservatory measures." Id. Scholars admit that classifying acts within
one of these categories is not easy. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Unfortunately, scholars do not detail whether this purposive
approach should be examined from the subjective viewpoint of the actor,
objectively in light of the circumstances, or both.
24. See Miller v. Seven C's Props., LLC, 800 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2001), writ denied, 811 So. 2d 878 (La. 2002) (co-owners sought declaratory
judgment because they could not decide among themselves whether repairs to
the property's levee system were "necessary" to preserve the co-owned thing).
25. See Allain v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 762 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2000) (whether act was of preservation or of management was a material issue
of fact that caused a reversal of summary judgment on appeal).
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legislation, however, many of these definitional issues can be
resolved, thus facilitating the functional application of the rule.
III. BACKGROUND
Why is the Louisiana rule regarding necessary expenses so
broad and vague? A glance at the past reveals that Roman
preference for full ownership, combined later with French disgust
for co-ownership, had a lasting effect on surrounding European
jurisdictions, as well as in Louisiana. A gap in Roman-French law
governing the rights and duties among co-owners left many
civilian jurisdictions on their own to draft such provisions without
model legislation. Thus, wide discrepancies now exist among these
European rules. In the face of such variance, the Louisiana drafters
apparently took a different approach and chose to create a co-
ownership provision devoid of much detail.
A. Historical Setting
The flaws of Louisiana's current co-ownership articles can be
traced to Roman ideals, 26 which expressed a general preference for
full ownership and, thus, passively discouraged co-ownership. This
favoritism for singular ownership was expressed in many
underlying principles of Roman property law. For instance, the
Romans believed that each co-owner's interest struck "every
molecule of the thing, '27 rather than each co-owner physically
owning a percentage of the property itself. Ownership could not be
fractionalized in any instance, even when held by many persons.
28
Also, if the property itself was to be transferred, it had to be done
so in toto or not at all.29 The Romans viewed co-ownership as a
temporary and exceptional condition, as evidenced by the adage,
nemo in communionepotest invitus detineri.30
26. Louisiana law is heavily built on traditional Roman principles, through
the historical influences of French and Spanish law. R. Fritz Niswanger,
Comment, An Unconscionability Formula for Louisiana Civilians?, 81 TUL. L.
REV. 509, 509 (2006).
27. Vanessa A. Richelle, Recent Development, Campell v. Pasternack
Holding Co.: The Right to Partition by Licitation under Revised Civil Code
Article 543, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1642, 1644 (1994) (citing 1 PLANIOL & RIPERT,
TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, pt. 2, ch. 4, no. 2497, at 473-74 (La. State Law
Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959)).
28. John Henry Merryman, Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme
by Lawson), 48 TUL. L. REV. 916, 926 (1974).
29. Id.
30. Translates to "no one can be kept in co-proprietorship against his will."
SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
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During the Roman era, it was as if no one in good sense would
ever choose co-ownership over "full" ownership and that no
person should ever feel compelled to remain in such an
unfavorable arrangement. Roman law looked hesitantly upon any
arrangement which restricted the rights of a single owner.31 Since
property in a co-owned scenario must be shared among several
proprietors, the privileges of owning property are necessarily
impeded by the wishes of others.32 Therefore, while co-ownership
existed under Roman law, full ownership was the preferred
arrangement.
Hundreds of years later, in the early nineteenth century, the
French returned to Roman ideology when revising their post-
revolution law.33 Using Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis as their
model for the Code Civil, French lawmakers sought to eradicate all
laws reminiscent of the formerly-empowered feudalist monarchy.
34
The division of property rights was thought to be characteristic of
the feudalistic policy that was to be overthrown.35 During the
feudalistic age, the survivorship features of co-ownership caused it
to fall into favor, as co-ownership "was valuable in avoiding
dilution of the feudal obligations through fragmentation of
ownership."36 Combining the pre-existing Roman preference for
full ownership with the more contemporary abhorrence for
feudalistic ideals, the French drafters refused to endorse co-
ownership in the Code Civil.37 Because of the risk that detailed
provisions governing the rights and duties among co-owners may
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 261 (1 1th ed. 1887)
(1861), http://books.google.com (enter search terms "Sir Henry Sumner Maine"
and "Ancient Law").
31. Kenneth S. Culotta, Forma Cinco? Getting the Benefits of Form 5 in
Latin American Mining Ventures, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9, § 9.03(1)(a)
(1993).
32. Symeon C. Symeonides & Nicole Duarte Martin, The New Law of Co-
Ownership: A Kommentar, 68 TuL. L. REV. 69, 84 (1993).
33. Culotta, supra note 31, at § 9.03(1).
34. Id.; UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 10 (2000).
35. MATrEI, supra note 34, at 13.
36. Hines, supra note 9, at 585.
37. While article 486 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 recognized co-
ownership, there was no such provision in the Code Napoleon of 1804. Article
486 of the 1825 Code provided that: "It is of the essence of the right of
ownership that it cannot exist in two persons for the whole of the same thing but
they may be the owners of the same thing in common, and each for the part
which he may have therein." LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION
OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, vol. 3, pt. 1, 279-80 (La. State Law Inst.
1940) [hereinafter COMPILED EDITION].
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have encouraged co-ownership, the French omitted such rules from
the Code Civil.
38
The absence of French provisions governing the relationship
between co-owners in any detail affected surrounding European
countries that were developing codes of their own. Because the
French Code Civil was the "stock nineteenth-century ideal of a
civil code," it served to guide the codification process in
surrounding nations. 39 As these jurisdictions had no model
provisions to help steer the drafting of their own law controlling
the rights and duties of co-owners vis-A-vis one another, they were
forced to either follow France's lead by nearly ignoring the
relationship or construct rules consistent with the Roman tradition,
yet based on the particular cultural idiosyncrasies of each
country. 40 This led to a great variance in co-ownership provisions
among European jurisdictions, and the impact of this disparity
would be felt years later in Louisiana.
The discrepancies in the European rules on co-ownership are
particularly evident in the rules governing situations in which a co-
owner mac act unilaterally to preserve the property held in
indivision. The rules range from the gapingly broad to the
38. Id. See also Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 73.
39. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 123 (1999). It should
be noted that the Btirgerliches Gezetzbuch (BGB), the German civil code, was
also influential to developing civilian jurisdictions. Id. Enacted nearly a century
after the Code Civil, the BGB did not revert to Roman ideals like its French
counterpart, but was rather drafted with "great respect for then-prevailing
nationalistic feelings." Safil Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REv. 1645, 1654
(1997). The BGB did provide detailed provisions fostering the relationship
among co-owners, such as those to govern the management and preservation of
the co-owned property as well as reimbursement for expenses resulting from
such activity. BURGERLICHES GEZETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] §§ 741-758
(F.R.G.) (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans., 1975). It is possible that the German
inclusion of such rules inspired surrounding jurisdictions to do the same, thus
resulting in comparable provisions in the countries of Greece, Italy, and
Switzerland. ASTIKOS KODIX [AK] [Civil Code] §§ 785-805 (Constantine
Taliadoros trans., 1982) (Greece); CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] [Civil Code] §§ 1100-
1116 (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 1969) (Italy); SCHWIZERISCHES
ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [Civil Code] arts. 646-654 (Ivy Williams trans.,
1987) (Switz.). It should be noted that the provisions of these particular
European countries are significant to this analysis due to their overwhelming
influence in drafting the Louisiana provisions. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 797 cmt. a
(2006).
40. See, e.g., PAN. J. ZEPOS, GREEK LAW 106 (1946) (stating that the AK
provisions relating to co-ownership reproduce the Greek law in force at the time,
i.e., the Roman-Byzantine law, in contrast to other AK provisions that basically
reproduced French law).
41. This discussion will examine provisions equivalent to Louisiana's
article 800. The European rules will necessarily focus on the countries that were
146 [Vol. 69
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meticulously narrow. For example, the broad German provision,
which is actually the most similar to Louisiana's rule, provides that
each co-owner may take "any measure necessary" to preserve the
co-owned property without the consent of the other participants.
42
On the other hand, both the Greek43 and Swiss" codes require
exigency as a prerequisite to unilateral action by a co-owner. The
Swiss rules further distinguish between imminent acts of
preservation and those that are merely "necessary" which occur
absent emergency. Under the Swiss rule for the latter category, acts
that are essential to the preservation of the value and
serviceableness of the object require unanimous consent prior to
performance.45 In contrast to all of these provisions, the Italian rule
does not discuss how much unilateral power a single co-owner has
to incur necessary expenses. It merely states that all co-owners
must share the costs of preserving the property held in indivision.46
Ultimately, an absence of French guidance and the wide variety of
particularly influential to the drafting of Louisiana's provisions. See LA. Civ.
CODE art. 797 cmt. a. These countries include Greece, Italy, and Switzerland.
The rule in the German BGB will also be referenced occasionally due to its wide
influence on surrounding jurisdictions. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 123. Thus,
later, general references to European or foreign provisions should be read as a
shorthand for the rules of these particular nations.
42. The German Code provides, in pertinent part: "Each participant is
entitled to take any measure necessary for the preservation of the object without
the consent of the other participants; he may require that they give their approval
in advance for such a measure." BGB § 744(2).
43. The Greek Code provides, in pertinent part: "In the case of imminent
peril each of the coparceners shall be entitled even without the consent of the
others to take measures required for the preservation of the thing." AK § 788
(emphasis added).
44. The Swiss Code provides, in pertinent part: "However they cannot
repeal or restrict the rights to ... take on his own the necessary steps which have
to be taken without loss of time in order to preserve the object from imminent or
increasing damage." ZGB art. 647 (emphasis added).
45. The Swiss Code further provides: "With the consent of all co-owners
maintenance work, repairs and renovations which are essential for the
preservation of the value and the serviceableness of the object can be executed
provided these acts are not usual acts of management to which each co-owner is
entitled singly." ZGB art. 647c (article entitled "necessary measures").
46. The Italian Code provides in one rule that "[e]ach participant shall
contribute to the expenses necessary for the conservation and enjoyment of the
common thing and to the expenses decided on by the majority.. . ." C.c. § 1104
(Italy). Furthermore, the Italian Code provides that "[a] participant who, in case
of neglect by the other participants or the administrator, has incurred expenses
necessary for the preservation of the common thing has a right to
reimbursement." C.c. § 1110.
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European legislation on point created the environment in which the
Louisiana provisions were drafted.
B. Development of Louisiana Co-ownership Provisions
Like the French Code Civil Louisiana's first effort at
codification, the Digest of 1808,41 did not contain a provision
recognizing the bare notion of co-ownership.48 The Code of 1825,
however, imported commentary by the French jurist Pothier to
acknowledge this arrangement. 49 The Code of 1870 reproduced the
basic recognition of co-ownership but failed to provide rules
governing the relationship itself so as to foster its development.
50
While recognizing that co-ownership may exist, Louisiana's
articles were more interested in providing methods of terminating
the relationship rather than regulating the rights of co-owners
against one another. 51 It is apparent, then, that at this stage of the
development of Louisiana's co-ownership provisions, the Roman
tradition, amplified by the Code Civil, dominated. Therefore, until
the 1990s, co-ownership in Louisiana was regarded as a temporary
arrangement destined for partition.
Co-ownership surged across the nation during the twentieth
century, to the point that it became the "dominant form of
ownership of residential and agricultural real estate in the United
States."5 This increase in co-ownership was attributable to many
47. It is unclear whether the drafters of the Digest of 1808 desired a true
code or a digest that merely compiled the present law. See Rodolfo Batiza,
Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 TUL.
L. REV. 628, 629 (1972); Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A
Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 601, 604 n.4 (1972).
48. COMPILED EDITION, supra note 37, at 280.
49. LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, A REPUBLICATION OF THE PROJET OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF 1825 43 (1937). Article 486 of the Code of 1825 provided: "It is
of the essence of the right of ownership that it cannot exist in two persons for the
whole of the same thing, but they may be owners of the same thing in common,
and each for the part which he may have therein." Id. Pothier's commentary
explained that the right of ownership to the exclusion of all others necessarily
means that two persons cannot be the owners of the whole of the same thing.
However, he explains that "nothing prevents them from being owners in
common," as owning a part of one in a thing in common means that each can
only dispose of his part. Id.
50. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 73; COMPILED EDITION, supra
note 37, at 279.
51. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 73.
52. See Lewis, supra note 9, at 398-99 n.204; SANDRA H. JOHNSON ET AL.,
PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 183 (2d ed. 1998). While
empirical data on co-ownership of immovable property in Louisiana is lacking,
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causes, including changes in tax rates, 53 estate planning, 54 higher
costs of living, and the acquisition of property by unmarried
couples. 56 The Louisiana legislature warmed toward co-ownership
and began considering it to be a "present state of affairs, rather
than as one that [was] bound to be terminated. 5 7 The rising
popularity of co-ownership arrangements led to the necessity of
formulating uniform rules to regulate the interactions between the
co-owners themselves. Although Louisiana courts at the time
recognized some rights and duties that existed between co-owners
these jurisprudential rules were neither adequate nor consistent. 59
Thus, the Louisiana State Law Institute was called upon to fill this
gap in the legislation.
59
While the development of Louisiana co-ownership provisions
was heavily influenced overall by the Greek, Italian, and Swiss
rules,60 the drafters selected the Greek provision to serve as the
source for the current article 800.61 Additionally, article 806, which
provides reimbursement for necessary expenses incurred under
it is reasonable to conclude that this nationwide movement had some impact on
local co-ownership trends.
53. Tracht, supra note 9, at 65. Income taxation was a factor that might
explain the increase in joint tenancies across the country in the 1940s, when
income tax rates rose. In an effort to minimize this tax burden, many split the
income from income-producing property by dividing the ownership of the
property. See Hines, supra note 9, at 588.
54. Lewis, supra note 9, at 399. Those with small estates began converting
the single title of property into a joint title with their desired beneficiary. This
avoided probate by allowing the beneficiary to receive the property interest by
survivorship. Id. at 399 n.206.
55. Id. at 400; Hines, supra note 9, at 590. Co-ownership was being utilized
by strangers in residential settings to make housing more affordable. See also
Leigh Gallagher, Lightening the Load, FORBES, Jun. 15, 1998, http://www.
forbes.com/forbes/1998/0615/6112192aprint.html (as prices rose for vacation
homes, parties started sharing ownership to decrease the individual costs of
owning a second home).
56. Lewis, supra note 9, at 401. The frequency of unmarried couples
increased in the 20th century, and naturally following from this trend, the
acquisition of property by these couples also increased. Id. Because unmarried
cohabitants lack the benefit of clear bodies of law, these couples must rely on
default co-ownership provisions to regulate their property rights. Id.
57. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 75.
58. Id. at 74. See generally Moody v. Arabie, 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986);
Connette v. Wright, 98 So. 674 (La. 1923); Litton v. Litton, 36 La. Ann. 348
(La. 1884); Fuselier v. Lacour, 3 La. Ann. 162 (La. 1848).
59. See Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 74.
60. LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 cmt. a (2006).
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 800 hist. n. See also AK § 788 (Greece).
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62
article 800, was drawn from the Greek and Italian rules. With
minor changes articles 800 and 806 were adopted by the council
as pr9posed. These provisions became effective January 1,
1991, and they have not been amended to date.
It should be noted at the outset that the drafters of these
provisions did not adopt any of the more detailed requirements of
the foreign sources consulted. Instead, they opted for a broader
rule; the reasoning behind this choice is uncertain. However, it is
possible that when faced with such discrepancies in the European
provisions, the drafters thought it would be best to express the
article in broad terms and leave the details to the jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, the jurissprudence has been inadequate in
developing these details.6 The problem must be revisited, and
greater legislative guidance in this area is needed.
C. Comparison of Louisiana 's Rules with Foreign Source
Provisions
Louisiana's co-ownership provisions were heavily influenced
by those in the Greek, Swiss, and Italian civil codes. However, in
comparison to Louisiana's article 800, the equivalent foreign
articles contain a much higher degree of specificity. The Louisiana
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 806 hist. n. The AK provides that: "Each of the
coparceners shall be responsible vis-i-vis the others in proportion to his share
for expenses incurred in connection with the preservation management and use
of the common thing." AK § 794. See also C.c. § 1104 (Italy).
63. Article 800 originally read that "[elach co-owner may without the
concurrence of any other co-owner take necessary steps for the preservation of
the thing that is held in indivision." Draft, 1990 La. Acts No. 990 (Mar. 12,
1990). For the approved version, "each" was changed to "a." Id. There is an
absence in the Institute's record of any comment that would suggest any
objection regarding the language of the provision. The Council did, however,
struggle with the language of article 806. Article 806 originally read: "A co-
owner is bound to his co-owners for necessary expenses, including ordinary
maintenance or repairs and reasonable management expenses, of the thing held
in indivision in proportion to his share." Draft, 1990 La. Acts No. 990 (Oct. 28,
1988). Some members of the Committee expressed concern that the expenses for
which a co-owner could be reimbursed were too broad in scope. Meeting of the
Property Committee: Ownership in Indivision (Sept. 16, 1989). It was argued
that the provision should be limited to those "necessary expenses" that were
incurred under article 800. Id. However, this position was rejected for the more
expensive list of expenses enumerated in the current rule (necessary expenses,
expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs, or necessary management
expenses paid to a third person). Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 806.
64. 1990 La. Acts No. 990, § 1 (on recommendation of the La. State Law
Inst.).
65. Examples of the courts' flawed application of articles 800 and 806 will
be demonstrated in Part IV.
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rule differs most predominantly from its source provisions in two
respects: the requirement of exigency prior to unilateral action and
a hesitant tone toward granting unilateral authority.
1. Exigency Requirement
A cursory glance at article 800 as compared to its Greek
equivalent reveals an important distinction: the lack of the word
"imminent" in the Louisiana rule. While Greek law allows for a
co-owner to act unilaterally, he may only do so in the instance of
"imminent peril,"66 where it would be impractical to acquire
consent from the others. Furthermore, the Greek rule is not
unusual: the Swiss provision also requires "imminent or increasing
damage" in order for a co-owner to perform acts to conserve the
67property. The term "preservation" standing alone infers some sort
of danger or loss, but the "degree of gravity this danger must have
is an open question" in the Louisiana provision.68 The addition of
an exigency requirement would facilitate the application of article
800 by giving further detail as to the kind of situations in which a
co-owner may act and incur expenses unilaterally.
2. Reluctant Tone
Article 800 also departs from the foreign sources consulted by
not incorporating a hesitant tone in authorizing unilateral action by
a co-owner. The language of the European provisions, even those
utilizing broad terminology, suggests a reluctance to allow a co-
owner to act without the consent of others holding an interest in the
property. This is accomplished by either incorporating certain
prerequisites that must be satisfied before the act may be
performed by a single co-owner,69 avoiding the grant of unilateral
authority altogether,7 ° or qualifying this grant with a phrase
suggesting that consultation with the other co-owners prior to the
act may be wise.71 In contrast, the language of article 800 leaves
this reluctance behind not by following any of these techniques,
66. AK § 788.
67. ZGB art. 647 (Switz.).
68. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 114.
69. AK § 788 ("imminent peril" must be present before a co-owner may act
"without the consent of the others"); ZGB art. 647 (the co-owned object must be
suffering from "imminent or increasing damage" prior to unilateral action).
70. See generally C.c. §§ 1100-1116 (Italy).
71. BGB § 744 (F.R.G.) (the last clause of the German provision states that
the acting co-owner "may require that [the other co-owners] give their approval
in advance for such a measure").
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but by expressly allowing acts of preservation "without the
concurrence of any other co-owner."
72
With the mandatory condition of imminent circumstances, the
Greek and Swiss provisions communicate a wariness of unilateral
action by sanctioning it only in exceptional instances that meet the
exigency requirement. 73 The Italian co-ownership provisions
express this hesitancy through legislative absence, by avoiding the
issue altogether. The Italian rules do not expressly allow a co-
owner to act unilaterally in any situation imminent peril or
otherwise. 74 Even the German provision, which is broadly-
worded and closely resembles that of Louisiana, states that the
acting co-owner "may require that [the others] give their approval
in advance for such a measure.', 76 The inclusion of this clause in
the rule suggests that while a co-owner may act without the
concurrence of the others to preserve the property, receiving prior
approval for the act might be beneficial. Thus, modem foreign
codes acknowledge, or at least give a nod to, the danger of
allowing a co-owner to incur expenses unilaterally. The Louisiana
provision, however, cuts against this trend by candidly giving each
co-owner the right to take steps for preserving the property without
the concurrence of any other party.
IV. FLAWS OF ARTICLE 800
In a general sense, the broad nature of articles 800 and 806 are
problematic in that a co-owner may affect a thing in which
multiple persons have an interest without consulting the others
first. In addition, the non-consenting co-owners will be further
burdened with the reimbursement for such an expense. More
specifically, however, the Louisiana rule is flawed in a number of
less apparent ways. First, courts have had difficulty applying the
current rule, particularly the vague term "necessary." Second, the
ambiguities of article 800 have led to manipulation of the
legislation by co-owners against their fellow co-owners. Finally,
the provisions cause unnecessary risk in property investment, as
the broad terminology used does not provide adequate notice of
when reimbursement may be due.
72. LA. CiV. CODE art. 800 (2006).
73. See AK § 788; ZGB art. 647.
74. See generally C.c. §§ 1100-1116.
75. While the German joint ownership rules were not a source for
Louisiana's provisions, the language of the German rule closely resembles that
of article 800.
76. BGB § 744.
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A. The Difficult Application of "Necessary"
Recall that doctrine defines "necessary" expenses as those that
are "incurred for the preservation of the thing" or to relieve the
property of private or public burdens.77 It would seem that in light
of this definition, classification of an expense as "necessary"
would focus on the function of the expense or the purpose for
which it was incurred. However, Louisiana courts have struggled
with defining and applying this term in a practical setting.
Specifically, the jurisprudential application of "necessary" presents
three main issues: misapplying "necessary" to hide the true
rationale for a decision, avoiding a determination of "necessary"
altogether, and developing an improper standard.
First, courts have used the rationale that an expense was
"unnecessary" to conceal the fact that reimbursement is denied for
other reasons. This technique is problematic because it skews the
impression of what kinds of expenses a court will classify as
necessary to preserve property. For example, in Succession of
Bell,78 a co-owner sought reimbursement for storage of co-owned
movable property. The acting co-owner in Bell was one of five
daughters, all of whom were co-owners of inherited property
passed down from their deceased mother.79 While living in the
decedent's home, the daughter placed some of the inherited home
furnishings in a commercial storage unit and incurred fees as a
result. The daughter attempted to utilize article 800, in pari
materia with article 806, to receive reimbursement from her co-
owners for the storage expenses.
Instead of discussing the daughter's purpose in light of
objective considerations for storing the property, or the possibility
that it needed to be in a controlled environment to maintain its
condition, the court denied reimbursement on the ground that the
co-owner could not have had legitimate concerns of others
vandalizing the movables "since [she was] staying in the house." 80
The court hinted, however, that it denied reimbursement because
the daughter actually placed the furniture in storage to inhibit her
co-owners from accessing it, thus lacking good faith in incurring
the expense.
81
Although the result was likely correct in Bell, the reasoning
was faulty in that it suggests that absent bad faith, the daughter still
77. YIANNOPOLOUS, supra note 13, at 551. See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 527.
78. Succession of Bell, 964 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007).
79. Id. at 1068-69.
80. Id. at 1074.
81. Id.
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would not have been reimbursed for the storage fees. Yet, in light
of objective circumstances, it may not have been so unreasonable
for a co-owner to incur such an expense to preserve the property.
For instance, because the daughter was living in the decedent's
house, the furniture was likely subject to damage by everyday use.
A reasonable person might want to place the furniture in storage in
an attempt to protect it from this harm, hence preserving the
property. Thus, in an objective sense, incurring this expense does
not seem completely unnecessary under these facts.
Rather than examining the course of action a reasonable person
might take to protect the property, the court merely dismissed the
expense as lacking necessity, a rationale that only masks the
court's true reasoning. The court made itself quite clear that it
denied reimbursement because it believed the daughter did not
deserve it--she lacked good faith. Since the Bell court did not
examine whether the expense was reasonably necessary, this
precedent adds further confusion to the already ambiguous term.
Secondly, practical use of the word "necessary" is flawed in
that, due to its vague nature, courts avoid its application altogether.
Because this term desperately needs definitional development,
dodging its use does not aid this endeavor. Miller v. Seven C's
Properties82 demonstrates the jurisprudential avoidance of
applying "necessary" in a pragmatic context. The co-owners in
Miller called upon the court to declare that repairs to be made on
the property's levee system were necessary expenses, such that the
acting co-owner would be entitled to reimbursement from the
others. While avoiding the question of whether or not the repairs
were truly necessary, the court merely determined that this was a
justiciable controversy subject to declaratory relief and remanded
to the trial court to make the complex finding of necessity. This
suggests that a court would rather remand a case to string out the
litigation in hopes of settlement rather than resolve the issue of
whether the expense is "necessary."
While the court unfortunately passed on the question of
necessity, its holding is significant in a different respect. By
finding this issue of necessity to be a justiciable controversy, the
court suggests that requesting a declaration that the expenses are in
fact those contemplated under articles 800 and 806 before they are
incurred is an intelligent strategy to avoid subsequent conflicts
regarding reimbursement. 83 Interestingly, the Miller court
recognized that the broad language of articles 800 and 806 has the





potential to cause conflict among the co-owners, implying that a
decision by the parties as to the necessity of the act before it is
performed would avoid excessive litigation at a later date.
Lastly, the application of "necessary" is difficult because the
only jurisprudential test that somewhat facilitates the necessity
determination focuses on improper inquiries. Currently, to resolve
whether an act is one of preservation, and thus whether the
expenses flowing from it are "necessary," two factors are
considered: (1) the nature and extent of the work necessary to carry
out the act; and (2) the impact such work would have on the co-
owned thing.
8 4
Exploring the magnitude of the act and its effect, however, is
the wrong standard. The principal analysis should concern the
purpose of the act, from both the objective viewpoint of a
reasonable person and by examining the subjective motive of the
acting co-owner. 85 Determining why the act was performed will
naturally lead to whether or not reimbursement should be ordered,
as those expenses that were "necessary," or incurred to preserve
the property, will be recovered by the acting co-owner. The fact
that courts are failing to perform the proper analysis in this area
should alert lawmakers that the current legislation is inadequate to
provide guidance.
B. Co-owner Manipulation
Aside from the courts' flawed application of articles 800 and
806, perhaps a more dangerous problem is that co-owners
themselves are manipulating the broad terms of the legislation to
utilize it for purposes beyond its scope. Distortion of the language
of these provisions has created complicated legal issues with which
courts do not want to get involved.86 As a result, excessive
amounts of time, money, and judicial resources have been87
needlessly wasted. While many instances of legislative
84. Allain v. Shell W. E & P, Inc., 762 So. 2d 709, 716 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2000). See also Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 01-57 (Mar. 20, 2001), which
reemphasizes the same test as set out in Allain in the context of conservation of
natural resources.
85. See YIANNOPOLOUS, supra note 20, at 183 (stating that "[firom a
functional viewpoint, the distinction of juridical acts into [the three categories] is
supposed to furnish guidelines . . . for the determination of the authority of
certain persons to act with respect to things under their ownership or control. In
this regard, classification actually depends on the purpose rather than the nature
of individual acts.").
86. Interview with Frank S. Craig, III, Partner, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson
LLP, in Baton Rouge, La. (Sept. 12, 2007).
87. Id.
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exploitation by co-owners occur unreported,88 one jurisprudential
example where a party attempted to use articles 800 and 806 out of
context was Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental Chemical Corp.
89
In Hawthorne, a majority co-owner, desperate to destroy
diversity jurisdiction, attempted to use articles 800 and 806 to join
the minority co-owner as a defendant. After the co-owned property
had been contaminated by a leaking pipeline, the majority co-
owner sued the responsible parties, but the minority co-owner
chose to settle with the defendants for its share of the damages.90
Because the minority co-owner could not be joined as a plaintiff
due to this settlement, the majority co-owner argued that the
minority co-owner should be joined as a defendant pursuant to
articles 800 and 806.91 Specifically, the majority co-owner urged
that it would be entitled to contribution from the minority co-
owner for damage-assessment costs, and as a result, the minority
co-owner was indebted to the plaintiff. Additionally, the majority
co-owner argued that if the minority's "share of the cost of
remediating the alleged damages [exceeded] its settlement
proceedings [then the minority would] be required to make up the
difference. 02
The flaw in the majority co-owner's argument was that no
expenses to preserve the property had actually been incurred.
Without an act incurring necessary expenses, reimbursement
cannot be ordered, and hence articles 800 and 806 should have no
application. Fortunately, the court acknowledged this weakness in
the majority co-owner's argument and denied the joinder,
reasoning that the anticipated failure of the minority to pay its
share of necessary expenses could not stand as grounds for its
joinder as a defendant.93 Although the Hawthorne court refused to
entertain the co-owner's misuse of articles 800 and 806, the case
nevertheless demonstrates the vulnerability the legislation has to
distortion by the co-owners themselves, thus defeating the policy
of timely dispute resolution.
88. Id.
89. No. 01-0881 (E.D. La. May 24, 2002).
90. Id. slip op. at 1.
91. Id. slip op. at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id. Apparently the resolution of this issue was not to the majority co-
owner's satisfaction, as it once again used the same argument involving articles
800 and 806 to try to force the joinder of the minority co-owner a year and a half
later. Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 01-0881 (E.D. La.
Dec. 8, 2003). The court, able to see through this transparent argument, stated
that the majority co-owner had not demonstrated why the legal theory had not
already been available. The joinder of the minority co-owner would once again
be denied. Id. slip op. at 4.
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C. Investment Obstacles Caused by Legal Ambiguities
The vague scope of authority granted to a co-owner to incur
expenses unilaterally and later to command reimbursement from
the others necessarily discourages investment in real property since
these unplanned preservatory expenses cannot be accounted for at
the conception of the investment. Encouraging property investment
is a strong policy concern in any state. This is particularly so in
Louisiana after the 2005 hurricane season and the resulting
property challenges. 94 Although investments have gradually
increased, as of 2006, Louisiana had little major private investment
when compared to the Mississippi Gulf Coast.
95
While large corporations can afford to invest in property-
related projects independently, individuals will usually only be
able to invest in a small business or vacation property by obtaining
ownership fights with others.96 In addition, co-ownership in this
sense is usually the product of a hand shake deal, subject to the
default rules of the Code. These relationships are easy to create and
result in lower initial transaction costs but expose the co-owners to
the risk of increased future disutes when they find themselves
trapped by the default regime. Clear legislation will necessarily
encourage property investment, by way of co-ownership, as the
parties will know at the outset the instances in which they may be
forced to contribute for necessary expenses.
V. SOLUTION: TWO-PRONGED TEST
In consideration of the preceding issues, a reworking of the
language in article 800 is required in order to narrow the ability of
a co-owner to unilaterally incur expenses and later command
reimbursement from the other co-owners. The new standard for
article 800 consists of a two-part, alternative test with different
requirements depending on the circumstances:
In imminent circumstances of emergency or threat of
loss, a co-owner may, in good faith, take necessary steps
94. See Hurricanes Katrina & Rita: Outstanding Need, Slow Progress, U.S.
Senate Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (2007)
(testimony of C. Ray Nagin, Mayor, City of New Orleans), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/012907Nagin.pdf.
95. Jay Newton-Small, Mississippi Outpaces New Orleans as Post-Katrina
Tourism Draw, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20670001 &refer=news&sid=aauRE91KqOsA.
96. Gallagher, supra note 55.
97. Id. See also Lewis, supra note 9, at 389-90; Tracht, supra note 9, at 65.
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for the preservation of the thing that is held in indivision
without the concurrence of any other co-owner.
Absent imminent circumstances, a co-owner may take
ordinary acts to preserve the thing held in indivision only
after securing the consent of the other co-owners
representing at least a majority of the ownership interest.
A. Imminent Circumstances and Good Faith
The first prong of the new standard includes two updated
requirements for unilateral preservation of co-owned property:
imminent circumstances and good faith. Exigency, a prerequisite
that many jurisdictions incorporate in their respective provisions,
provides justification for granting unilateral authority. The addition
of this requirement to article 800 would align Louisiana's rule with
that of foreign provisions and add consistency to its application.
Furthermore, charging a co-owner with a duty of good faith while
incurring the necessary expense would not alter the current
standard of care imposed on ordinary co-owners but would provide
additional protection from two angles. First, the non-acting co-
owners would rest-assured that the expense was incurred in their
best interest and with objective reasonableness, as well as
subjective honesty. Second, if the acting co-owner was in good
faith, he would not be forced to bear the entirety of the expense if
it was later found to be "unnecessary." Ultimately, the imminent
circumstances and good faith requirements would provide for a
more easily applied rule.
1. Imminent Circumstances of Emergency or Threat of Loss
Logically, the only instance in which unilateral action by a co-
owner is justified would be where imminent circumstances prevent
the ability to obtain consent from the other co-owners. In this
instance, the lapse of time needed to notify and receive approval
from the non-acting co-owners would result in harm to or loss of
the thing held in indivision. When a scenario arises that reasonably
forces a single co-owner to make a prompt decision in order to
defend the property from impending danger, the law should never
require him to perform any additional task other than that
necessary to protect his investment. Otherwise, if consent were
required in this instance, the result would likely be
counterproductive.
Justifying unilateral preservation of property in the face of
urgent circumstances is a rationale familiar to Louisiana property
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law. In Louisiana Civil Code article 2899, the borrower of a thing
may, in certain instances, claim reimbursement from the lender for
expenses sustained to preserve the thing lent.98 Expenses will be
"necessary" in this context if the expenses were extraordinary and
so urgent "that the borrower could not give notice to the lender
before incurring the expenses." 99 Furthermore, the expenses
contemplated under article 2899 do not include those that are
ordinary for the preservation of the thing lent.'00 Interestingly, a
cross reference to article 806 appears in the comment to article
2899, suggesting that the term "necessary expenses" in the co-




In addition, both foreign provisions 1 2 and common law
principles'0 3 acknowledge the value of including a circumstantial
requirement of immediacy, promptness, or peril in order to
rationalize unilateral action by a co-owner. The Greek provision,
also the source for article 800,104 is identical to the Louisiana rule
in most respects, with the exception of the "imminent peril"
requirement.'0 5 By omitting this situational requirement from the
language of article 800, the Louisiana provision requires a lesser
standard for a co-owner to act unilaterally, 106 thus facilitating a
98. Louisiana Civil Code article 2899 provides: "The borrower may not
claim reimbursement from the lender for expenses incurred in the use of the
thing. The borrower may claim reimbursement for expenses incurred for the
preservation of the thing lent, if the expenses were necessary and urgent." LA.
Civ. CODE art. 2899 (2006) (emphasis added).
99. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2899 cmt. b.
100. Id.
101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2899 cmt. c.
102. AK § 788(b) (Greece) (requires "imminent peril" to justify unilateral
action); ZGB art. 647 (Switz.) (requires "imminent or increasing damage"
before unilateral acts to preserve may be performed).
103. The Restatement of Restitution provides that
[w]here two persons are tenants in common or joint tenants and one of
them has taken reasonably necessary action for the preservation of the
subject matter or of their common interests, he is entitled to indemnity
or contribution, enforced by means of a lien upon the interest of the
other (a) if he made a request to the other to join in such preservation,
or (b) without such request if action was immediately necessary and the
other was not available.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 105 (1937) (emphasis added).
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 800 hist. n. (2006).
105. AK § 788(b).
106. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 114. See also Succession of
Steckler, 712 So. 2d 1066 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998) (although the ordering of
reimbursement for lawn care expenses was probably necessary to maintain the
appearance of the grass, it was likely not incurred to prevent impending harm);
Knighten v. Knighten, 809 So. 2d 324, 329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001), writ
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single co-owner's ability to incur expenses unilaterally and
command reimbursement from the other co-owners.
Similar to the Greek provision, Switzerland's rule also requires
"imminent or increasing damage" before a co-owner may act
without the consent of the other parties.10 7 Notably, while the
Swiss provision was not the source for article 800, it was very
influential in the drafting of Louisiana's co-ownership articles in
general. 1
08
Not limited to Greece and Switzerland, this circumstantial
restraint on unilateral acts of preservation has also been adopted in
the common law tradition. At common law, while a co-owner is
expected to request the participation of others before performing
an act that would affect the co-owned thing, it makes an exception
in instances of emergency, where consultation with the other
parties would be impractical. 10 9 The Restatements also address the
issue of reimbursement for unilaterally-incurred expenses, stating
that the acting co-owner will be entitled to contribution for
reasonably necessary expenses if he either made a request for the
others to join in the act or it was immediately necessary and the
other co-owners were unreachable. 1 0 Ultimately, at common law,
notice to other co-owners will not be required when prompt action
is reasonably needed to protect the property." I l
An exigency requirement needs to be added to the current
language of article 800 because some Louisiana courts are
allowing reimbursement for expenses that were not truly necessary
to preserve the property from imminent harm. Incorporating an
imminent circumstances requirement into article 800 would ensure
denied, 805 So. 2d 207 (La. 2002) (awarding reimbursement for expenses
relating to the replacement of an air conditioning unit, which was necessary for
comfort, but not incurred in an emergency scenario).
107. ZGB art. 647(2).
108. See, e.g., LA. Crv. CODE art. 797 cmt. a (2006) (stating that there are
"corresponding provisions in modem civil codes" and citing as examples the
Greek, Swiss and Italian Codes).
109. Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self-Interest, and
the Limits of Free Riding, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 831, 856 (2003).
110. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 105 (1937).
111. See Lovrien v. Fitzgerald, 66 N.W.2d 458, 463 (Iowa 1954) (holding
that to require the acting co-owner to give notice or request participation of
other parties would have been useless and futile under the particular
circumstances); Casso v. Fullerton, No. 04-05-00905-CV, slip op. at 2 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Sept. 13, 2006) (finding that a co-owner should be




a consistent analysis for determining when reimbursement should
be ordered for a unilaterally-incurred expense.
An example of an erroneous order for the reimbursement of
necessary, yet non-imminent, expenses may be found in
Succession of Steckler.1 12 There, the court affirmed the trial court's
judgment with scant analysis, allowing reimbursement not only for
insurance payments but also for lawn care expenses. Unlike
insurance payments, which are absolutely needed to protect the
property and presented a justifiable claim for reimbursement,
trimming the lawn simply cannot be said to meet the same
exigency requirement, as these expenses are not essential to the
preservation of the property from impending damage or loss.
114
Thus, an imminent circumstances requirement would not only
narrow the unilateral authority of a co-owner to incur these
expenses but would also provide a uniform criterion to aid a
court's decision as to reimbursement.
2. Good Faith
Whereas the advantages of an imminent circumstances
requirement are effortlessly explained, the utility of imposing a
good faith duty on the acting co-owner may not be immediately
apparent. The benefits of a good faith duty are largely obscured by
its amorphous meaning; thus, providing a new definition of "good
faith" in the co-ownership context is necessary to understand how
it would be applied. Additionally, supplementing article 800 with a
good faith duty would provide protection to the co-owners and,
like the imminent circumstances requirement, would ensure
uniformity in court analysis. Thus, it would not be superfluous in
light of the prudent man standard already imposed on co-
112. 712 So. 2d 1066, 1071 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998).
113. Id. It should be noted that the executor of a decedent's estate is charged
with an affirmative duty to preserve, repair, maintain and protect the property of
the succession. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3221 (2006). However, the claims for
reimbursement regarding the lawn maintenance were considered necessary
expenses "incurred by the succession as co-owner," and not in the actor's
capacity as the executor of the estate. Therefore, no affirmative duty to preserve
should have existed, such that the failure to perform such activities might have
exposed the executor to liability.
114. While lawn care may have been desirable to prevent the grass from
dying, this sort of expense is more likely related to the appearance of the
residence. Even if incurred to preserve the integrity of the lawn, it cannot be said
that they fall within the same category of mandatory expenses such as property
taxes or insurance payments. Insurance payments, if not paid, can result in an
inability to repair property that has already been damaged, and a failure to pay
property taxes can cause a loss of ownership altogether.
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owners. 115 Finally, the case for good faith is bolstered by
comparison with other regimes that employ a similar duty.
a. Definition in the Co-ownership Context
Like a chameleon, the term "good faith" has the ability to take
on different characteristics depending on the framework in which it
is applied. 16 Even within property law, the meaning of good faith
varies with its context. For instance, good faith in acquisitive
prescription rests upon a reasonable belief in light of objective
considerations, that the party in possession believes that he is the
owner. 117 However, the definition of good faith is altered slightly
for accession, where a possessor will only be in good faith if he has
an act translative of ownership and is unaware of any defect in his
ownership. 1 8 Despite differing meanings, the common thread in
these definitions is that good faith in property law consists of both
subjective and objective ingredients. Also, good faith in property
law does not seem to be an active duty imposed on the possessor
but rather a personal condition or state of mind." 9
A definition of good faith in the co-ownership context should
remain consistent with its use in other property provisions. Thus, a
co-owner should be in good faith in preserving the property held in
indivision when he not only subjectively believes that the act was
needed but also that this belief was justified objectively in light of
the circumstances.
However, the definition of good faith in co-ownership cannot
cease at this point. Unlike other areas of property law, when one
acts on property held in indivision, he is not only acting for his
own ownership interest but is simultaneously acting on behalf of
others as well. In this sense, co-ownership has been seen as a
hybrid relationship, intermixing personal and proprietary rights.
120
Therefore, a general definition of good faith in contracts, in
addition to that in property law, is helpful to an understanding of
its application in a co-ownership setting. Generally, good faith in
the contractual realm is said to encompass a certain honesty or
loyalty to the other party involved, perhaps invoking an
expectation of morality in the execution of the obligation.
121
115. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 799 (2006).
116. Litvinoff, supra note 39, at 1649-51.
117. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3480.
118. LA. CIV. CODE art. 487.
119. Litvinoff, supra note 39, at 1649.
120. MAINE, supra note 30, at 257.
121. Litvinoff, supra note 39, at 1664.
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While a melding of property and contract definitions of good
faith is a novel concept under Louisiana law, it is required in this
instance due to the unique characteristics of co-ownership that
cause it to be neither purely proprietary nor personal. Ultimately,
this new definition of good faith in co-ownership should unite
certain features of the term as understood in both property and
contract law. Hence, a co-owner should be in good faith under the
revised standard if: (1) he had a subjective belief that the steps
taken to preserve the property were in the best interest of all
parties involved; and (2) the act taken was objectively reasonable
in the face of imminent circumstances.1
22
b. As Opposed to the Prudent Man Standard
At first glance, the addition of good faith in article 800 may
seem superfluous considering the "prudent man" standard already
imposed on co-owners under article 799.123 However, article 799
merely charges each co-owner with an overarching standard of
care to avoid acting in a manner that would cause harm to theproperty. 124 Unlike the duty of a prudent administrator, the prudent
man standard does not impose liability for negligence or require a
co-owner to act affirmatively to preserve the property held in
indivision. 125 While article 799 refers to a duty to avoid causing
harm to the property itself, it does not impose any obligation to
prevent intangible "damage" to the other co-owners. 126 Therefore,
the addition of good faith within article 800 would not be repetitive
of the standard already imposed, as it contemplates a responsibility
122. The subjective and objective inquiries are drawn from the definition of
good faith in property law, as seen under Louisiana Civil Code articles 487 and
3480. Asking whether the preservation is in the best interest of the other co-
owners is an inquiry borrowed from contract law. See Litvinoff, supra note 39,
at 1664.
123. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 799, which provides that "[a] co-owner will be
liable to the other co-owners for any damage to the thing held in indivision caused
by his fault." Scholarly commentary has characterized this standard as that of a
"prudent man." Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 104.
124. The prudent man standard in Louisiana Civil Code article 799 is
comparable to the general duty to refrain from harming others, as found under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial
Regimes, 51 LA. L. REv. 321, 331 (1990); Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32,
at 103. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
125. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 101-02. The addition of good
faith in article 800 would not alter the standard imposed by article 799 or impose
an affirmative duty to preserve, but would rather add an additional layer of
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wider in scope than the mere avoidance of harm to the property.
Good faith charges the acting co-owner with a duty to perform the
unilateral steps of preservation in an objectively and subjectively
honest manner while also keeping the interests of the other co-
owners in mind.
Superimposing a good faith duty onto the prudent man
standard would be beneficial to both the non-acting co-owners as
well as the acting co-owner. From the viewpoint of the non-acting
co-owners, they can be ensured that the expense was incurred only
because the single co-owner had an honest belief that an
impending threat would endanger the co-owned property. Thus, the
addition of good faith would prevent an abuse of the right
127
granted in article 800 for a co-owner to act unilaterally to preserve
the property.
Furthermore, because the law is reluctant to punish those acting
in good faith,128 the imposition of this duty would remedy a harm
that the broad language of article 800 could presently have on the
acting co-owner. Under the current standard, an acting co-owner
may be denied reimbursement where he incurred an expense which
he reasonably believed was "necessary" to preserve the property
under articles 800 and 806 but that after-the-fact turned out not to
be.' 29 Hypothetically, this situation might occur where it appears
that a hurricane is approaching the co-owned land, and in reliance
on weather reports, a single co-owner takes steps to lessen the
possible devastation. However, this effort later turns out to be in
vain, as the hurricane takes a sudden sharp turn prior to landfall
and the property escapes harm. Under current article 800, the
acting co-owner may be held solely accountable for these
expenses, as the steps taken turned out to be unnecessary.
However, under the new standard, the other co-owners would be
responsible for reimbursement, as it would be wrong to punish a
co-owner who was acting in good faith to preserve the co-owned
property. Therefore, the addition of this duty only furthers the
"safety valve" function of article 800 for the acting co-owner and
127. Litvinoff, supra note 39, at 1660-61.
128. Id. at 1646-47.
129. This harm was recognized in Miller v. Seven C's Properties, LLC, 800
So. 2d 406, 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001). In a typical setting, this issue of
reimbursement is usually examined from the perspective of the co-owners that
played no role in incurring the expense. However, because of the subjective
nature of the term "necessary," the Miller court notes the possibility that a co-
owner may proceed with the act, honestly believing it to be essential to protect
the co-owned thing, only to later be denied reimbursement based upon a finding
that the act was not that contemplated under the legislation.
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provides protection beyond that contemplated under the prudent
man standard.
Additionally, the inclusion of good faith would supply
uniformity to court analysis that is not currently provided by the
prudent man standard. For instance, while some Louisiana courts
are applying a good faith standard to unilateral acts of preservation
to determine whether reimbursement should be ordered, others do
not consider this factor. In Succession of Bell, although the court's
reasoning for denyint reimbursement for the storage expenses was
a lack of necessity,1 it was highly likely that the co-owner was
denied reimbursement because the expenses had not been incurred
in a good faith effort to preserve the property. If a duty of good
faith was included in article 800, the court in Bell could have
denied reimbursement on that ground, rather than concealing its
reasoning with the "lack of necessity" rationale.
Whereas some courts are considering the acting co-owner's
state of mind or reasonableness of the expense for reimbursement
claims, 132 others do not embark on such an analysis. 133 Like the
addition of an imminent circumstances requirement, including
good faith as a prerequisite to reimbursement under articles 800
and 806 would guarantee that a uniform test is applied by courts.
Finally, including a good faith duty in article 800 would align
Louisiana's generic co-ownership provisions with that of
Louisiana's mineral law regime and the common law rule. For
instance, a co-owner of a mineral lease in Louisiana may only
operate independently when preventing waste, destruction, or
termination, and in so acting he must do so in good faith.1
34
Likewise at common law, a co-owner requesting reimbursement
130. Succession of Bell, 964 So. 2d 1067, 1074 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007).
131. Id.
132. For example, see Southwestern Gas & Electric v. Liles, where a
Louisiana court allowed reimbursement for necessary expenses to conserve an
oil well held in indivision because the expenses were incurred "in an honest
effort to preserve the property." 133 So. 835, 837 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931)
(emphasis added).
133. See generally Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 860 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 2003), writ denied, 862 So. 2d 995 (La.), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 992 (2004);
Mitchell v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 89-0976 (E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1991).
134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:177 (2000) (providing that a co-owner of a
mineral lease "may act to prevent waste, destruction, or termination of the lease
and to protect the interest of all, but cannot impose upon his co-owner liability
for any costs or expenses except out of production. In so acting he must act in
good faith and must deal with the interest of the remaining owner or owners in
the manner of a reasonably prudent lessee whose interest is not subject to co-
ownership.") (emphasis added).
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for preservatory expenses must have incurred these expenses in
good faith.' 35
Overall, the addition of good faith would not alter the present
standard of care that applies to ordinary co-owners but would add
currently unseen benefits. If a good faith duty was imposed on the
execution of unilateral acts of preservation, the interests of both the
acting and non-acting co-owners would be protected. Furthermore,
the inclusion of good faith within article 800 should provide
consistency in jurisprudential application of the rule. Finally, this
addition would parallel the rules of other property regimes, which
also require acts of preservation to be carried out in good faith.
c. Comparison with Similar Duties
Comparing good faith in co-ownership with other heightened
duties reinforces the need for this requirement in article 800.
Specifically, when examined in light of the fiduciary duty and the
duty of a prudent administrator, the benefits of incorporating good
faith into article 800 become apparent. Unlike these similar duties,
good faith should not impose an affirmative responsibility on co-
owners to preserve the property held in indivision; rather, it should
merely add an additional layer of protection and assurance that the
acting co-owner does not abuse the right granted to him in article 800.
i. Fiduciary Duty
As defined in the partnership context, a fiduciary duty requires
that a partner not conduct activities contrary to the goals of his
partners and of the partnership as a whole.' 36 This heightened
standard between fiduciaries is clearly justified in a partnership
scenario, as a single partner has the ability to subject the entire
partnership to an obligation, thus exposing his partners to personal
135. 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 90 (2007). This rule provides that "one
tenant in common is entitled to charge the others with a proportion of the
reasonable expenses incurred fairly and in good faith for the benefit of the
common property." (emphasis added). See also Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp.,
732 S.W. 2d 644, 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987); Lovrien v. Fitzgerald,
66 N.W. 2d 458, 465 (Iowa 1954). Common law courts will also deny
reimbursement for "speculative efforts to preserve the common estate." Neeley,
66 S.W. 2d at 465.
136. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2809 (2006). Article 2809 provides that
[a] partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership and the partners. He
may not conduct any activity, for himself or on behalf of a third person,
that is contrary to his fiduciary duty and is prejudicial to the
partnership. If he does so, he must account to the partnership and to his
partners for the resulting profits.
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liability. 137 However, the same cannot be said of co-ownership, as
a single co-owner can only hold the others personally responsible
for reimbursement of expenses already paid. Thus, the prevailing
view in Louisiana is that co-owners are not fiduciaries merely by
virtue of their relationship.'
38
Good faith, on the other hand, has been described as "halfway
between a fiduciary duty and the duty to refrain from active
fraud."' 3 9 Good faith is a better fit for the instance of co-
ownership, as a single co-owner has less power to bind his fellow
co-owners to obligations than a partner does. 140 Consequently,
while the inclusion of good faith within article 800 would not be an
express adoption of a fiduciary duty, it would impose some sort of
heightened duty involving honesty or fair dealing on the co-owner
relationship.
ii. Duty of a Prudent Administrator
Examining good faith in light of a prudent administrator duty
also exemplifies the benefits of requiring co-owners to preserve
co-owned property in good faith. Recall that article 799 holds
ordinary co-owners to a prudent man standard to avoid causing
harm to the property held in indivision. 141 In contrast, a prudent
administrator duty holds the actor liable for his fault, neglect, or
default, thus imposing an affirmative duty on the actor to preserve
the property in order to avoid such liability. This duty of a prudent
administrator is imposed on those acting to manage the affairs of
another, as well as on ex-spouses in preserving former community
property. While a good faith duty would not extend as far as
137. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 104.
138. Id. Interestingly, the common law imposes a fiduciary duty upon co-
owners in certain situations. In Cummings v. Anderson, the Washington
Supreme Court said that there are "[t]wo situations [that] give rise to most of the
problems involving the existence and extent of fiduciary relations between
tenants in common. These are: (1) the effort by one cotenant to buy in and later
to assert a superior title to the detriment of his cotenants; and (2) the making of
an agreement with the other cotenants, in which some advantage is gained by
'overreaching' the others." 614 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Wash. 1980) (citing 4A R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 605 (P. Rohan ed., 1979)). See also
SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 366 (4th ed. Thomson West 2007) (1987) (stating
that "[a]s fiduciaries, co-tenants cannot deal with the property in their own self-
interest if the effect of such self-dealing would be to affect adversely the other
co-tenant's title").
139. Litvinoff, supra note 39, at 1668.
140. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 104.
141. LA. CIV. CODE art. 799.
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requiring an ordinary co-owner to preserve the co-owned property,
it would secure good intentions and a clear conscience in executing
the unilateral act of preservation.
The first instance in which the Louisiana Civil Code charges
one to act as a prudent administrator is under the doctrine of
negotiorum gestio, or management of the affairs of another. Under
this doctrine, one acts to manage the affairs of another when he
"acts without authority to protect the interests of another ... in the
reasonable belief that the owner would approve of the action if
made aware of the circumstances." When a co-owner unilaterally
preserves the co-owned thing, his actions bear a likeness to those
that would occur under negotiorum gestio.14 2 Gestors 143 are
obligated to affirmatively preserve the property that they manage,
subject to liability for neglect. 144 Whereas most agree that
negotiorum gestio does not apply to acts authorized under article
800,145 it is not entirely clear why this is the case. 146
Like a fiduciary duty, the prudent administrator standard
applied to gestors is inappropriate for co-ownership as it requires
142. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2292.
143. One acting under the doctrine of negotiorum gestio is often referred to
as a "gestor."
144. Louisiana Civil Code article 2295 provides that "the manager [or gestor]
must exercise the care of a prudent administrator and is answerable for any loss
that results from his failure to do so." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2295.
145. LA. CIV. CODE art. 800 cmt. (stating that "[t]his is not unauthorized
management of affairs of another under . . . Article 2295"). See also Spaht,
supra note 124, at 331-32.
146. An exegetical analysis of the language of article 2292 suggests two
reasons for which this doctrine does not apply to acts arising under article 800.
First, when a co-owner acts unilaterally to preserve the co-owned thing, he is not
only managing the affairs of another, but also of himself Additionally, as a
person holding an ownership interest in the property, the co-owner has the
authority to preserve the thing, and therefore it would not be unauthorized
management. Cheryl L. Martin, Comment, Louisiana State Law Institute
Proposes Revision of Negotiorum Gestio and Codification of Unjust
Enrichment, 69 TUL. L. REV. 181, 189 (1994). This is not to say that this
doctrine will never apply in the instance of co-ownership. Both jurisprudence
and scholarly commentary reveal that if a co-owner performs an act unilaterally
that reaches beyond those contemplated in article 800, then negotiorum gestio
would attach and the prudent administrator duty would apply. Symeonides &
Martin, supra note 32, at 116. See also Granger v. Granger, 967 So. 2d 540,
543-44 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2007); Gibson v. Gibson, 692 So. 2d 708, 709 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1997). Although unclear, this might occur when a co-owner
undertakes administrative acts beyond mere preservation without the
concurrence of the other co-owners. Because acts of administration or
management usually require unanimous consent of the co-owners, it makes
sense that a heightened duty would apply when a co-owner undertakes an act of
a more substantial nature without the concurrence of the others.
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affirmative preservation of the property, threatening liability for
neglect. Therefore, imposing a prudent administrator duty to acts
arising under article 800 would alter the pre-existing prudent man
standard, which does not impose an affirmative duty to preserve
the co-owned thing. Instead, a co-owner should be subject to the
standard of good faith when acting unilaterally, so as to ensure that
he acts for the benefit of all parties when exercising the right
bestowed by article 800.
A second instance in which the prudent administrator duty
applies is where an ex-spouse has former community property
under his control. 147 The rationale for this increased duty is that
former spouses are peculiar co-owners in that they are "less likely
to remain on friendly terms or to continue to share a common
purpose."' 148 Again, a prudent administrator duty is inappropriate
for ordinary co-owners; however, a comparison of co-owners with
former spouses strengthens the case for some sort of heightened
duty when a co-owner acts without concurrence under article 800.
Due to the plethora of property disputes between co-owners
that are either family members or cohabitating couples, the logic
behind the increased standard in the former community property
context sug ests a need for an increased standard for acts under
article 800.q49 Because of the "human element" in property
disputes between these common classes of co-owners, it would
147. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2369.3. Article 2369.3 provides, in pertinent part,
that
[a] spouse has a duty to preserve and to manage prudently former
community property under his control, including a former community
enterprise, in a manner consistent with the mode of use of that property
immediately prior to termination of the community regime. He is
answerable for any damage cause by his fault, default, or neglect.
Id. (emphasis added).
148. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Co-ownership of Former Community Property:
A Primer on the New Law, 56 LA. L. REv. 677, 679 (1996). See also Granger,
967 So. 2d at 544-45 (stating that the rationale for the heightened standard for
former spouses is that "the law no longer assumes that a spouse who has former
community property under his control will act in the best interest of both
spouses in managing it").
149. Examples of family property cases include Giardina v. Giardina, 158
So. 615 (La. 1935); Succession of Bell, 964 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2007); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 860 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003);
Succession of Riehlman, 4 Teiss. 400 (La. Ct. App. 1907). Examples of
cohabitating couple disputes include Johnson v. Antoine, 735 So. 2d 856 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1999); Glover v. Sowada 457 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. Hampton 153 So. 2d 187 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963); Chambers v.
Crawford, 150 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963). See also Lewis, supra note 9,
at 401; Tracht, supra note 9, at 67.
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make sense to apply a higher standard of care for unilateral acts of
preservation.
However, the prudent administrator standard imposed on
former spouses is once again inappropriate for co-ownership, as it
includes an affirmative duty to preserve. Additionally, the prudent
administrator standard is too stringent for generic co-ownership
because family members and cohabitating couples are not likely as
vindictive as former spouses. The addition of a duty of good faith
in article 800, on the other hand, would prevent emotions from
affecting the co-owned property and ensure that acts of
preservation are performed rationally.
B. Majority Consent Absent Imminent Circumstances
Under the new standard in article 800, imminent circumstances
and good faith are required for a co-owner to act unilaterally on a
co-owned thing. These requirements not only serve to protect the
non-acting co-owners from unforeseen expenses but also to ensure
that the acting co-owner receives reimbursement for a bona fide act
of preservation. Absent an emergency, however, a co-owner
wishing to incur expenses to protect the property from gradual
deterioration should be required to consult others having an
interest in the property before performing the act. 150 The second
prong of proposed article mandates just that. Gaining the consent
of co-owners representing a majority interest'51 in the co-owned
150. To distinguish these acts of preservation from those occurring under
imminent circumstances, these acts will be referred to as "ordinary" steps to
preserve the co-owned property.
151. Unfortunately, a pragmatic exception to the rule of majority consent
occurs in the instance where two co-owners have an equal, undivided interest in
a thing. In this scenario, a majority cannot technically be achieved without
unanimous consent, as each party owns exactly 50% of the interest. However,
this proves to be no obstacle to the proposed majority consent rule for many
reasons. First, in almost every instance of gaining consent, there will be some
surplus percentage of agreement. For example, in the instance of four co-
owners, each owning an equal interest, three of the co-owners (or 75%) must
agree to the act of ordinary preservation, thus resulting in 24% excess consent.
The instance of two co-owners is no different-there is merely a higher level of
surplus consent. Secondly, the task of obtaining the consent will be less onerous
in the instance of only two co-owners, as the acting co-owner must only
convince one other party to agree that the act is necessary. Finally, if a co-owner
having a 50% interest in the thing were able to act unilaterally in all instances of
preservation, imminent or otherwise, then the purposes of requiring consent in
the first place would be unfulfilled. Not only would a check on the acting co-
owner's judgment be absent, but the other co-owner would be without notice
that the act occurred, would never have had an opportunity to object, and would
be more likely to protest when asked for reimbursement post-performance.
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thing prior to incurring the necessary expense would fulfill a
variety of beneficial purposes.
First, requiring majority consent would provide notice to the
other parties that an act is about to be performed on property with
which they have an interest. Along the same lines, it would cause
the other co-owners to be aware that they should expect an extra
expense in the near future. Being able to plan for future expenses,
through increased communication among co-owners, would do
away with many of the bitter disputes that can arise between co-
owners.
Second, a majority consent requirement would dispense with
many reimbursement issues at the outset, thus avoiding later
conflicts and litigation. If a majority of co-owners were consulted
before the expense was incurred, then they should be estopped
from complaining about reimbursement at a later date. In Miller v.
Seven C's, the court suggested that a preliminary verification of the
necessity of the expense, by either the parties or the court, would
be helpful in maintainin 5 2 a harmonious relationship when
reimbursement is requested. Furthermore, a declaration by the
parties at an early stage that the expense is necessary would also
protect the acting co-owner by "prevent~ing] the possibility of one
co-owner proceeding with the repairs, only to be denied
reimbursement based upon a later finding that the repairs were not
those contemplated under [a]rticle 806, while the other co-owners
reaped the benefits of the improvements."'
153
Third, requiring that the acting co-owner consult others having
a majority interest in the property will serve to check his judgment,
certifying that the act is absolutely necessary to maintaining the
condition of the property. Because exigency is not a factor in
instances where majority consent is required, it will be less likely
that an expense in this instance is actually "necessary" to protect
the property.154 For instance, it could be argued that re-painting a
co-owned house is an act to preserve the exterior from gradual
corrosion or decay.' 55 This act, however, would also likely enhance
the value of the co-owned progerty, thus resulting in a useful,
rather than necessary, expense.'6 Therefore, requiring the acting
152. 800 So. 2d 406, 411 (La. App. 3dCir. 2001).
153. Id.
154. Recall that expenses are divided into three categories-necessary, useful
and luxurious. YIANNOPOLOUS, supra note 13, at 551-53.
155. National Association of Corrosion Engineers, Household Corrosion:
Consumer Tips, http://events.nace.org/library/community/household/tips.asp
(last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
156. Recall that useful expenses are those that result in the enhancement of
the value of the property. YIANNoPoLoUs, supra note 13, at 551. The
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co-owner to consult other co-owners prior to incurring the expense
will confirm the necessity of it. If the others disagree as to the
necessity of the expense, this process would also provide the other
co-owners with an opportunity to object if they believe the expense
to be excessive.
Not only would this requirement be functional, but consent
requirements are usually a prerequisite to ordinary acts of
preservation. In fact, both the common law and the Swiss Civil
Code embrace similar rules. At common law, a co-owner desiring
indemnity or contribution for acts to preserve the thing should
"inform the other [co-owners] and request [them] to participate or
to pay [their] proportionate share., 157 Furthermore, the Swiss Code
requires unanimous consent for acts of preservation that are
"essential," yet not immediately necessary under the
circumstances. .58
Notably, the newly suggested language of article 800 only
requires the consent of co-owners representing a majority interest,
rather than the higher standard of unanimity imposed by other
jurisdictions. The majority rule is a superior one because it
eliminates the circumstance where a single co-owner could "hold
out" and prevent the protection of the property. 159 However, the
majority consent requirement still provides the benefits of notice,
disposal of conflict, and verification of the act's necessity.
Additionally, majority consent requirements are frequently
utilized elsewhere in Louisiana property law. Therefore, including
a majority consent rule in article 800 would align the generic co-
ownership provisions with other Louisiana property regimes.
Under the Louisiana condominium regime, a contract for
maintenance, management, or operation of the property may be
cancelled by a majority vote of individual unit owners.1 60
significance of classifying an expense as one that is useful versus one that is
necessary is that if merely useful, the acting co-owner may not be guaranteed
reimbursement under article 806. LA. CIV. CODE art. 806 (2006) (the only
expenses that can be reimbursed under article 806 are "necessary expenses,
expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs or necessary management
expenses paid to a third person").
157. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, § 105 cmt. c (1937).
158. ZGB art. 647c (Switz.) (providing that "[w]ith the consent of all co-
owners maintenance work, repairs and renovations which are essential for the
preservation of the value and the serviceableness of the object can be executed
provided these acts are not usual acts of management to which each co-owner is
entitled singly").
159. Symeonides & Martin, supra note 32, at 123.
160. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.105 (2008) (providing, in pertinent part,
that "[a] contract for the maintenance, management, or operation of the
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Additionally, a super-majority requirement' 6 1 is imposed by both
the timber and mineral regimes. For example, when a buyer
purchases timber from a co-owner, he may not remove the timber
without receiving approval from most of the other co-owners.
162
Finally, in mineral servitudes, a co-owner is forbidden to conduct
operations on the property without the consent of co-owners
representing an eighty percent interest.1
6 3
In sum, imminent circumstances justify unilateral action by a
co-owner to preserve the co-owned property; however, absent an
emergency, a co-owner wishing to act upon co-owned property to
prevent gradual, ordinary damage should be required to consult the
other co-owners first. Obtaining the consent of co-owners
representing a majority interest in the property, a less onerous
standard than unanimity, would provide notice to the other co-
owners, dispense with reimbursement issues at the outset, and
check the judgment of the acting co-owner. Because other regimes
employ consent requirements, this rule would unify Louisiana's
default co-ownership rules with those of other Louisiana property
regimes, the common law, and the Swiss Civil Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the 1990 enactment of co-ownership provisions was a
significant stride to filling the legislative gap perpetuated by the
Roman-French disapproval of this arrangement, the broad rule that
condominium property or any lease of recreational or parking facilities entered
into by the association while the association is controlled by the developer of the
condominium shall be subject to cancellation by the association by vote of not
less than a majority of the individual unit owners").
161. Under a super-majority rule, an act cannot be done without obtaining
the consent of co-owners representing at least eighty percent interest.
162. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.2(B) (2003) (providing, in pertinent part,
that "[a] buyer who purchases the timber from a co-owner or co-heir of land
may not remove the timber without the consent of the co-owners or co-heirs
representing at least eighty percent of the ownership interest in the land,
provided that he has made reasonable effort to contact the co-owners or co-heirs
who have not consented and, if contacted, has offered to contract with them on
substantially the same basis that he has contracted with the other co-owners or
co-heirs").
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:175 (2000) (providing, in pertinent part, that
"[a] co-owner of a mineral servitude may not conduct operations on the property
subject to the servitude without the consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided eighty percent interest in the servitude, provided that he has made
every effort to contact such co-owners and, if contacted, has offered to contract
with them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted with another co-
owner").
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currently grants unilateral authority to incur, and to be reimbursed
for, necessary expenses is inadequate to protect co-owners from
unforeseen expenses, thus resulting in excessive conflict. This
problem can be solved by amending article 800 to include a two-
pronged test, requiring imminent circumstances and good faith for
unilateral acts and a majority consent requirement for acts of
ordinary preservation.
The need for immediate action justifies unilateral acts of
preservation as a lapse of time needed to gain consent would only
further endanger the property. A good faith duty that includes
aspects of both property and contract law would ensure that these
acts are carried out with subjective honesty and objective
reasonableness as well as with the best interest of the others in
mind.
In contrast, a co-owner wishing to remedy more gradual harm
to the co-owned property should first be required to gain the
consent of those representing a majority interest. This prerequisite
would fulfill many purposes, such as providing notice, checking
the actor's judgment, and dispensing with reimbursement issues at
the outset.
This revised standard, which narrows the unilateral power of a
co-owner, is a more sensible approach when compared to the
present rule. Adopting this new test would facilitate the practical
application of article 800 and help to preserve co-ownership
arrangements in Louisiana.
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